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Addressing the Foreclosure Crisis
Through Law School Clinics
Nathalie Martin* & Max Weinstein**
INTRODUCTION

Since the 2008 financial crisis, unprecedented numbers of homes have been
lost to foreclosure in the United States, 1 all while public funds for free or reduced
fee legal representation in some communities have all but disappeared. 2 This
means that most homeowners in foreclosure are unable to find lawyers to represent them. At the same time, clinical legal education, especially in subjects
related to business and commercial law, is on the rise.
This convergence offers a unique opportunity for law school clinics to give
students valuable training in both litigation and financial law and also help fill the
deep need for legal representation by homeowners in foreclosure. Each of us has
experience representing homeowners in foreclosure, Max at Harvard Law School
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Legal Education and Poverty Law sections, entitled The Debt Crisis and the National Response: Big
Changes or Tinkering at the Edges, as well as remarks made by both Professors Martin and Weinstein at a
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1. By one government estimate, the financial meltdown caused the loss of 8.8 million jobs and
$19.2 trillion of household wealth. U.S. DEP'T TREAS., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REsPONSE IN CHARTS:
APRIL 2012, at 11-12 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/
Documents/20120413FinancialCrisisResponse.pdf. In the decade leading up to the meltdown, the
number of residential mortgage loans in foreclosure averaged 1.2 million per year. U.S. CENsus BUREAu,
MORTGAGE ORIGINATIONS AND DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURE RATEs: 1990 TO 2010, at 743 (2012),
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s 1194.pdf.
Between 2007 and 2010, average annual foreclosures increased 200% to 3.6 million.ld.
2. Attorneys general in forty-nine states recently settled a lawsuit charging the five largest mortgage
servicers with fraud and misdeeds in the foreclosure process. See Help for Homeowners, NAT'L
MoRTGAGE SETILEMENT, http://nationalmortgagesettlement.com/help (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
In some states, the resulting settlement money is being used to provide legal representation for
homeowners. See id.
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in the Predatory Lending and Consumer Protection Clinic, and Nathalie in the
University of New Mexico School of Law's Business and Tax Clinic.
In this Article, we discuss our experiences and offer advice and insights for
clinics considering taking cases of this kind. Part I provides a very brief overview
of the conditions that led to the financial crisis, a description of the extent of the
problem, and a few ways clinical law programs can help. Part II discusses the
practical and philosophical reasons why law school clinics play such a pivotal
role in stemming the effects of the crisis on homeowners, through examples of
cases litigated in Max's clinic. Part ill attempts to give readers a few of the basic
tools they need to add this practice to their clinics for the benefit of individual
homeowners and their communities.

I. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
A. Changes in Lending Practices
Relatively recent lending practices have changed the entire world of mortgage lending, not to mention foreclosure defense? In the decades following the
Second World War, mortgage lending was relatively uneventful. Mortgage loans
largely conformed to conservative guidelines to ensure affordability and timely
repayment, and mortgage borrowers defaulted in historically modest numbers. 4
As a result, few courts had occasion to reflect at great length on the law of
mortgage foreclosure.
The lending market of the past decade could hardly have been more different.
Gone are the days when borrowers obtained mortgages from bankers who knew
them and who used pencils, paper, and local reputation to determine whether
borrowers would repay their loans. Rather, virtually all recent mortgages were
made by a lender who did not continue to have a relationship with the borrower
but instead immediately sold the resulting notes and mortgages, and securitized
them, bundling the mortgages and selling off the resulting income streams to
investors. 5 Given the fees lenders could make originating loans, the quantity of
the loans rose in spectacular fashion. 6 Given lenders' disinterest in whether
borrowers would actually be able to pay back the loans, the quality of loans
decreased. 7 At the same time, interest rates were historically low and housing
3. For a detailed account of the entire financial crisis, see IVJHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. McCoY,
THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (Oxford Univ. Press
2011).
4. Between 1950 and 1990, mortgage lenders commenced foreclosures on fewer than 1% of
outstanding mortgage loans on an annual basis. Peter J. Elmer & Steven A. Seelig, The Rising Long-Term
Trend of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosure Rates 21-22 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Working Paper

No. 98-2, 1998).
5. Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of the Robo-Signing
Scandal, 64 MEL. REv. 18,23 (2011).
6. See id.
7. See id.
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